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The 2014 west African Ebola epidemic shone a harsh light on
the health systems of Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. While
decades of domestic and international investment had
contributed to substantial progress on the Millennium
Development Goals,1 2 national health systems remained weak
and were unable to cope with the epidemic. Routine care of the
population also deteriorated during the outbreak.1-4 Surveillance
systems did not function effectively, allowing Ebola to spread
within and between the countries. Global institutions were slow
to respond to the crisis, squandering an opportunity to stem its
course.5-7
Since then, diverse panels of experts have pointed to political
and technical deficiencies in multilateral organisations in
tackling health crises.8-11 These reports have noted that the first
line of defence against future pandemics is an effective national
health system. They have also called for better measurement of
public health capacity, and investment to build resilient health
systems—systems that can withstand health shocks while
maintaining routine functions.10 The issue of how global bodies
can support countries in withstanding future health shocks is
playing out now in the election of the new director general of
WHO, with several candidates making health system resilience
part of their election planks.
Based on recent literature, this paper defines health system
resilience as “the capacity of health actors, institutions, and
populations to prepare for and effectively respond to crises;
maintain core functions when a crisis hits; and, informed by
lessons learnt during the crisis, reorganise if conditions require
it.”12 Health system resilience is relevant in all countries facing
health shocks—whether sudden (Ebola, earthquakes, terror
attacks, refugees), slower moving (new pathogens such as Zika
becoming endemic or epidemiologic transition), or the more
chronic stresses that characterise even times that seem calm
(drug shortages, loss of key health personnel, smaller outbreaks
of endemic diseases). Yet, while health system resilience has
been defined andwidely discussed, there is debate about whether
the concept has anything new to add to discussions on health
system strengthening, and how resilience can best be built and
measured.
As shown in figure 1⇓, resilient health systems are aware,
integrated, diverse, self regulating, and adaptive. These features
do not arise in a vacuum: they require a foundation of strong
local and national leadership, a committed health workforce,
sufficient infrastructure, and global support. The last point is
especially worth emphasising: resilience is not self sufficiency.
Crises do not respect geopolitical boundaries and so resilience
requires thoughtful interconnectedness or “smart dependency.”
In this paper, we argue that the concept of resilience adds
substantial value to the health systems discourse, andwe propose
measures of health system resilience.
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Exploring the concept of resilient health
systems
While the construct of resilience has been widely used in diverse
fields, including ecology, engineering, and psychology, it is
relatively new to health.13-17 With a plethora of frameworks and
catchphrases crowding the global health lexicon, there are
legitimate questions about the value added by the concept. We
identify three contributions of the concept of resilience to the
health systems field.
First, resilience emphasises the functions health systems need
(figure 1⇓) to respond and adapt to health shocks, introducing
a dynamic dimension into more static health system models
which can help the system cope with surges in demand and
adapt to changing epidemiology and population expectations
of care.18 A rigidity of mission characterises the operations of
many countries’ health systems, whose ethos and organisation
is better suited to yesterday’s disease burden than tomorrow’s,
focusing mostly on basic, episodic care, unequipped to provide
advanced care for infections, longitudinal care for a broad
spectrum of chronic diseases, or emergency care needed to
respond to the rising tide of injuries.
Second, the concept contributes useful new ideas to health
systems from other sectors. Solutions for supply chains and
logistics to respond to surges in demand from other fields may
be relevant.19 20 Building trust and promoting meaningful
community engagement have been studied in other fields, such
as environmental sustainability and political science, but have
not been well operationalised in health systems science.21-23
Resilience draws on complex systems notions identified as
important in health systems but rarely acted upon, such as the
interconnectedness of health and non-health actors and the
importance of feedback loops.24
Finally, the concept of resilience helps bridge disparate health
and development agendas—such as universal health coverage,
the Global Health Security Agenda, and the Sustainable
Development Goals—lending fresh impetus to the need to invest
in health systems.25-28 It identifies the immediate and longer term
payoffs of well functioning, responsive, and adaptable health
systems and highlights the unacceptable costs of inaction. By
containing outbreaks, returning to baseline function faster, and
mitigating other shocks, resilient health systems can contribute
to economic stability.29 The recognition that health systems are
the front line for dealing with the next big threat to global health
security amplifies the urgency of strengthening them and draws
in new actors and ideas.10
The increasing attention to resilience in global health has,
however, prompted criticisms of the concept. One is that it is
an imposed, technocratic solution that obscures the
socioeconomic and political factors that lead to inadequate
responses to shocks. These factors may include unfavourable
trade terms, weak citizen engagement, and chronic health system
deficiencies.30-33
There are also worries about short term timeframes for action
when problems are multifactorial, and a paradoxical push for
national self reliance when threats readily cross borders.31
While these concerns highlight the potential for resilience to be
used as shorthand for a narrow preparedness agenda, they do
not accurately represent the meaning of health system resilience
as intended here. Building resilience is much more than
preparedness; it involves investment in institutions,
preconditions (like an effective health workforce) and other
“slow variables.” Communities should not have to shoulder
crises alone; instead meaningful government engagement is
needed to ensure responsive health services that people trust
and want to use.12 Imposed technocratic solutions will not bring
about needed change, and the particular arrangements needed
to promote resilience have to emerge from the country’s context.
Value judgments about what constitutes resilience for whom
should be made explicit. Ordinary people may lack the power
to shape the health system response or hold it to account; the
process of building resilience should foster that power. Building
resilience should be integrated with existing efforts to strengthen
health systems and its success should be judged on equitable
health gains rather than the security of wealthy nations.
Resilience in action
We present three case studies, in which several of the authors
were involved, where a range of large health shocks contributed
to improved health system resilience: chronic system
dysfunction aggravated by a population influx in Lebanon;
sudden and severe infectious disease outbreak in Liberia; and
repeated, anticipated disaster shocks in Indonesia.
Awareness is the capacity to detect and interpret local warning
signs and quickly call for support. Liberia’s initial paralysis
during the Ebola epidemic was partly caused by poor
understanding, at all levels, of the disease severity. Self
regulation is the ability to isolate threats and maintain core
functions under stress. While Ebola treatment units are a classic
example of self regulation (in Liberia’s case, these came too
late to mitigate spread), Lebanon’s emergency vaccination and
surveillance efforts, and Indonesia’s regional crisis mitigation
centres can also be seen as homoeostatic innovations for
containing health threats.
Indonesia’s case also shows the value of learning and adaptation:
in anticipation of future catastrophic weather events crisis
mitigation centres were instituted after the country experienced
poor coordination after tsunamis. In each of these case studies,
most elements of resilience emerged after a crisis rather than
ahead of it. As we note below, future research should consider
how the elements of resilience perform when adopted before
the event.
The value of having diverse healthcare providers that can
coordinate with each other is seen in the case of Lebanon, which
is now hosting 1.8 million refugees from Syria, increasing its
population by over 30%.34 Tomeet the challenge of much larger
numbers of people seeking care, the ministry of health has
expanded primary care to tackle the multiple health needs of
both refugees and citizens. This has been done in part through
consultation and contracting with private sector providers,
including faith based providers; an example of integration among
diverse health actors who in the past may not have worked
together.
Integration also draws attention to the key mediating role that
broader state-society relations play during crises, including the
recognition of people as producers of their health and thus as
co-architects of an effective crisis response. Involving people
and communities in crafting a response depends on—and is a
potential means of—strengthening government accountability
to its citizens. Stronger mechanisms for state-society
partnerships allow government officials to weave the experience,
expectations and capabilities of affected people into the
containment strategy for a more powerful and empathetic
response. Identifying ways to work effectively with local leaders
was a critical lesson from Liberia during the recent Ebola
epidemic. Community leaders were critical in case finding,
community mobilisation, and other epidemic control measures.
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Box 1: Integrated approaches to care for diverse needs: working with non-state actors during the Syrian refugee
influx in Lebanon
Since the beginning of the Syrian civil war in 2011, Lebanon has had an unprecedented influx of refugees, increasing its population by 1.5
million, or 30%.34 The Syrian crisis persists today, placing continuing strain on Lebanon’s health system. Lebanon’s health system has
demonstrated resilience by rapidly mobilising and expanding its diverse primary care capacity in the public and private sectors.
Initial refugee health relief focused on short term assistance delivered by multiple organisations.37 38 The fragmentation of early relief efforts
motivated the ministry of public health to establish a steering committee to streamline relief funding and encourage transparency and
accountability across international and national health actors.39
Primary healthcare grew to be the central platform for the response. In 2015, the government and its multi-sectoral partners (including
UNHCR, UNDP, World Bank, and NGOs) established 20 new public health centres and directly supported 100 private health centres,
increasing primary care capacity by 40%.40 Covered services include non-communicable disease screening, nutrition services, and mental
health support.40 41 Additions to the epidemiological surveillance system improved the ability to detect emerging diseases, contributing to the
country’s quick response to polio threats.42
Despite early successes in primary care, access to Lebanon’s secondary and tertiary healthcare systems continues to be a challenge for
refugees.40 41 Recent estimates suggest that approximately 26% of the refugee population needs secondary healthcare, however 23% of
those are unable to access it, primarily because of high fees (71%).43 Financial assistance is limited to specific conditions and requires
co-payment, which contributes to substantial financial burdens for refugees.40-44
Box 2: Learning from failure: communicating with communities during Liberia’s Ebola crisis
At the peak of the 2014 Ebola epidemic, Liberia reported 300 to 400 new cases each week and had the highest incidence of Ebola deaths
of the affected west African nations.45 Meanwhile, non-Ebola patients were neglected—health facilities lacked testing and isolation capacity
and thus turned down patients who appeared sick.46 Some facilities simply stopped providing services altogether. Some urban and rural
communities resisted surveillance and disease control efforts, believing Ebola was purposely introduced by the government and foreign
institutions to gain profits from emergency response activities.46-48 Trust was further eroded by inadequate response from Ebola task forces
and help hotlines when neighbours fell ill.47
Gradually, Ebola treatment units opened and health facilities resumed services. At the same time, the ministry of health and partner NGOs
launched a series of public health messages beginning with “Ebola kills,” intended to emphasise the gravity of the epidemic.49
This approach backfired. Communities reasoned that if Ebola was fatal then affected people should avoid treatment units and instead wait
to die at home, supported by family.49 Public messages gradually evolved to “the earlier you report Ebola, the more likely you are to survive.”
Traditional leaders were enlisted to support community training in all 88 counties and spread messages in local dialects.50
To improve the effectiveness of the epidemic response, communities were directly engaged in surveillance. InWest Point, Monrovia’s largest
slum, community and traditional leaders were assembled to discuss concerns and propose a locally driven solution for Ebola surveillance
in the densely populated area.50 51 A system for active case finding developed. Leaders recruited community volunteers to complete ministry
led surveillance training, which eventually led to the deployment of 152 active case finders and 15 psychosocial support workers.51 Active
case finders and psychosocial support workers helped identify potential Ebola cases, reduce caregiver transmission, and promote burials
by trained “safe and dignified” burial teams.
Box 3: Improving self regulation: coordinating multiple actors during natural disasters in Indonesia
Spread across three major geologic fault lines, Indonesia experiences periodic earthquakes and tsunamis. Each recent disaster has tested
the country’s health system and led to progressive adaptation.
The 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami devastated the province of Aceh.52 Overnight, 106 health facilities in Aceh were damaged or destroyed,
and more than half of the health workforce was displaced or killed.53 54 The government struggled to organise a response and assistance
was further delayed by security concerns: Aceh had been the site of recent battles between the government and the Free Aceh Movement,
a guerrilla separatist group.55 56
When aid arrived, provision was chaotic with duplication of efforts in some areas and gaps in services in others. It took two weeks to establish
a disaster coordination centre, and nearly a month for the Aceh health system to resume function.
Two years later during the 2006 Yogyakarta earthquake, the national response was remarkably different. Hours after the earthquake the
president of Indonesia temporarily relocated his office to Yogyakarta to support the National Disaster Management Agency emergency
efforts.57 While 67 of 115 health centres in Yogyakarta were damaged or severely destroyed, domestic health teams were quickly mobilised
to provide emergency relief.58 59 The response to this earthquake—both more efficient and more locally driven—was informed by lessons
learnt from Aceh and the absence of conflict in the area.
Learning from these experiences, Indonesia established nine regional crisis mitigation centres in 2009.60 Strategically located in disaster
prone areas, these centres are proactively equipped with staff, vehicles, and emergency supplies, and perform community outreach with
local health facilities in between natural disasters, teaching basic first aid and natural disaster response.61 62
Measuring resilience capacity: the
resilience index
Recent international panels reviewing the Ebola response have
called for measurement of health system resilience capacity
ahead of crises.10-36 Building on the conceptual framework
described in figure 1⇓, we have outlined a set of preliminary
measures of national health system resilience (table 1⇓). They
include existing health system and preparedness metrics (from
the International Health Regulations, the Global Health Security
Agenda, and the Sustainable Development Goals), relevant
measures from non-health fields, and new proposed measures
that need further development and testing. This proposed
resilience index balances slow (availability of district health
staff with public health training, for example) and fast (such as
provisions to reallocate money in emergencies) drivers of
resilience. In contrast to traditional health security frameworks,
many of our indicators reflect characteristics of “everyday”
resilience; they not only encourage daily function but also
proactively reduce the likelihood of rising system threats. The
index can thus inform development of national health plans. It
can also expose gaps in function and measurement capacity
where regional and global cooperation can contribute.
The index does not prescribe national benchmarks. Given the
heterogeneity of health systems and national contexts,
benchmarks for resilience indicators should be set within
countries to accommodate the local context. The next step would
be to review and extend this list as needed, and to develop
indicators for the new measure constructs, with input from
community leaders and non-health sector actors.While the index
is meant to be prospective (used in advance of a crisis), some
proposed measures include routinely collected service delivery
and quality indicators that over time can indicate the “slope” of
resilience (the extent and speed with which a system returns to
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baseline or better after a shock). The validity of the resilience
index should be tested against actual performance during recent
health shocks in several settings.
Conclusion
Before the failure of health systems during the Ebola outbreak
is forgotten, we need to consider how to make them more
resistant to crises and more flexible in their response. The
concept of resilience adds dynamism and urgency to the
longstanding work of health system strengthening and gives an
opportunity to learn from other sectors. Country experiences as
varied as Lebanon, Liberia, and Indonesia demonstrate how
resilience can be built after health crises. Proposed measures of
health system resilience can improve our assessment of
countries’ progress in building resilience and indicate areas for
action. We hope implementation of these ideas can energise
policymakers and ultimately benefit families and communities
in times of crisis and beyond.
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Table
Table 1| Resilience index
RationaleMeasuresAimsCharacteristics*
Real time geo-registry of HWs, supplies, and facilities (including NGOs
and private operations) can realistically gauge available national capacities
1 Distribution of health system assets and
weaknessesa
Know health system
capacity
Aware
Routine health monitoring helps system detect service fluctuations and
accurate assessments of crisis impact, and rate of return to baseline after
a shock
2 Health service utilisation trends
Routine surveillance is necessary to detect disease threats and trigger
mitigation mechanisms
3 Presence of active epidemiologic
surveillance systema,b
Know risks and
population
Basic knowledge of population demographics is important for estimating
health threats and trends, and understand crisis impact
4 Functioning civil registration and vital
statistics system
Point persons across sectors must be immediately accessible for
communication, decision making, and sounding alarms
5 List of decision makers in key sectorsaCommunicate
Communities must be able to notify and sound alarms—this requires an
environment of free speech and freedom of press, and functioning, open
platforms for timely communication (hotlines, community committees,
social media)
6 Breadth of functioning communication
channelsa
Including services that respond to population health needs and
expectations in basic primary care package will promote routine health
system utilisation and confidence in the health system
7 Scope of health services available in primary
carec
Effectively respond to
range of health needs
Diverse
Health outcomes, healthcare utilisation during crisis, and trust in health
authorities require competent and respectful care
8 Quality of care for sentinel conditions in
basic packagec
Total health system funding must be sufficient to support functioning
services; financing systems should aim to reduce catastrophic and
impoverishing health spending63-66
9 Financing of healthcare: adequacy of
government health expenditure and financial
protectionc
Adequately finance
health systems;
prevent financial harm
Establishing agreement about roles for private providers—not for profit
and for profit—in crisis expands service provision in emergencies and
may promote collaboration in times of calm
10 Memorandums of understanding with
non-state providers
Isolate threat and
maintain core function
Self regulating
A routinely updated global, open access library of service delivery models
tested and deemed effective in past crises promotes inter-country learning
and lowers redundant reinvention and perpetuation of failed ideas
11 Database of service delivery alternatives
for affected and unaffected populationsa
Agreements on nature of collaboration (timing, type of support, roles or
responsibilities) during emergencies is a form of smart dependency and
contributes to a faster, more effective response29
12 Collaboration agreements with regional
and global actors
Leverage outside
capacity
Ready coordination systems encourages fast decision making and
implementation, curbing potential effects of emergencies
13 Existence of a national emergency
coordination system and leadersa
Coordinate with
non-health actors
(education, transport,
police, media, private
enterprise)
Integrated
Rehearsal of preparedness plans and regular collaboration establishes
norms of intersectoral teamwork
14 Frequency of joint planning sessions and
drillsa
Acknowledging human ties to the environment and other species
encourages an inclusive understanding of public health vulnerabilities
15 Process for development of a One Health
strategyb
Quick action in responding to community needs can foster trust and
promote containment of health shock
16 Index of Ministry of Health and government
responsiveness to community need
Engage citizens and
communities to build
trust
Trust in government and the health system is essential to effective service
delivery and for acceptance of government messages in crises—this is
true in government run and mixed provider health systems67 68
17 Population trust in health system
Regular input about health system functioning from citizens will improve
emergency planning and establish communication channels for routine
and emergency needs
18 Platforms for dialogue with community
leaders
Tapping experts in sociology, anthropology, and related disciplines
strengthens understanding of key social structures in crisis response,
local health determinants and the local appropriateness and acceptability
of interventions
19 In-country social scientists with experience
working with health departments
Public health staff serve to promote public health practices and act as
sentinels for potential outbreaks connecting local clinics to surveillance
and monitoring system
20 Availability of district health staff with public
health trainingb
Link healthcare
provision to public
health
Defined agreements on the role of primary and referral facilities reduces
confusion and service delay, and streamlines service delivery for patients
21 Agreement on roles and referral protocols
for facilities
Coordinate primary
and referral care
Flexible spending of funds—national and international—speeds up and
better targets emergency response in fast changing situations
22 Formal provisions to reallocate funds in
emergency
Shift resources to meet
need
Adaptive
For personal use only: See rights and reprints http://www.bmj.com/permissions Subscribe: http://www.bmj.com/subscribe
BMJ 2017;357:j2323 doi: 10.1136/bmj.j2323 (Published 23 May 2017) Page 6 of 8
ANALYSIS
Table 1 (continued)
RationaleMeasuresAimsCharacteristics*
For decentralised responses, local health teams must be able to interpret
local data and local leaders must be able to make quick and sound
operational decisions
23 Management capacity of district or local
health teamsc
Promote rapid local
decision making
Pre-crisis agreements permitting local decision making in crisis with
sufficient support hasten response time to evolving challenges
24 Agreements on delegation of authority and
funding in crises
Rigorous monitoring during crisis and independent evaluation post-crisis
permits course correction and points to needed reforms. National capacity
for data use and, more broadly, a culture of open inquiry and evaluation
needs to be built in times of calm to deliver during a crisis.
25 Mechanisms for, and capacity to, track
progress and evaluate health system
performance in crisis and in times of calmb
Evaluate to improve
*Characteristics are interrelated and interdependent. Decision making and coordination should occur across these characteristics
a, b, cindicate concepts similar to proposed International Health Regulation, Global Health Security Agenda, and sustainable development goals, respectively
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Figure
Figure 1 Resilient health system framework12
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